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ABSTRACT
We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder.  The
founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as
well as on how much, if any, of the shares to float on the stock exchange.  We assume that a
professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder’s decision is shaped
by the legal environment.  Specifically, we show that, in legal regimes that successfully limit the
expropriation of minority shareholders, the widely held professionally managed corporation
emerges as the equilibrium outcome.  In legal regimes with intermediate protection, management
is delegated to a professional, but the family stays on as large shareholders to monitor the
manager.  In legal regimes with the weakest protection, the founder designates his heir to
manage and ownership remains inside the family.  This theory of separation of ownership from
management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate
governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-
country evidence.
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I. Introduction
Most firms in the world are controlled by their founders, or by the founders’ families and
heirs.  Such family ownership is nearly universal among privately held firms, but also dominant
among publicly traded firms.  In Western Europe, South and East Asia, Middle East, Latin
America, and Africa, the vast majority of publicly traded firms are family controlled (La Porta et
al. 1999, Claessens et al. 2000, European Corporate Governance Network 2001, Faccio and Lang
2002).  But even in the United States and the U.K., some of the largest publicly traded firms,
such as Wal-Mart Stores and Ford Motor, are controlled by families.
A crucial issue in the discussion of family firms from the perspective of corporate
governance and finance is succession.  For nearly every entrepreneurial firm that does not fail,
there comes a moment when the founder no longer wishes to manage it.  This can happen from
the very beginning, when founders seek professional managers to run their firms, as is the case in
high technology startups in the United States.  Alternatively, succession takes place later in a
founder’s life, when he retires or cuts his workload. The new manager can be either a
professional or the founder’s heir. If a professional is hired, the founder also needs to decide
whether to stay on and monitor him, or to sell out.  Unless the founder appoints his heir or the
professional manager buys the company outright, ownership and management become separated.
The patterns of separation of ownership and management vary across countries.  In the
United States, founders often hire professional managers early on.  By the time the founder
retires, he and his family retain only marginal ownership.   In such Berle and Means (1932)
corporations, professional managers exercise nearly full control.  In Western Europe, significant
ownership typically stays with the family after the founder retires.  His children either hire a4
professional manager, as in BMW or FIAT, or run the firm themselves, as in Peugeot. In
emerging markets, both management and ownership tend to stay with the family when the
founder retires. When a professional manager is badly needed, he occasionally marries into the
family.
In this paper, we attempt to understand theoretically these different patterns of separation
of ownership and management.  The principal benefit of hiring a professional is that he is likely
to be a better manager. The principal cost is that now the professional manager, rather than the
founder, controls the company and so can expropriate investors or, in more polite language,
consume the “private benefits of control” (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Grossman and Hart 1988).
We argue that a crucial factor shaping the attractiveness of delegated management is the degree
of legal protection of outside shareholders from expropriation (or tunneling) by the insiders.
Earlier research shows that legal protection of outside shareholders varies sharply across
countries, and that this variation predicts the differences in financial development and ownership
structures (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 2000, Johnson et al. 2000). In this paper, we examine the
costs and benefits of delegating management from this perspective. This allows us, in particular,
to examine the costs and benefits of keeping the succession of management inside the family.
We present a model of a founder looking for a manager to succeed him.  We assume that
there is no superior manager available with sufficient resources to buy the firm outright.  When
such a manager (or a company) is available, the firm is simply sold to them – as often happens.
Absent an outright buyer, the founder chooses among three options.  He can sell out completely
in the stock market and create a widely held firm run by a professional manager.  He can hire a
professional manager but stay on as a large shareholder to monitor him.  He can also keep the
firm inside the family by either staying on as a less than ideal manager or passing management to5
a family member, who is generally not as talented as a professional manager. The founder makes
this decision to maximize the value of the firm, which initially he owns completely.
We study the trade-off between superior management by the professional outsider and his
discretion to expropriate shareholders.  If the founder stays on as a large shareholder and
monitors, he can control expropriation to some extent.  In our framework, both the law and the
monitoring reduce managerial expropriation.  We show that, when legal protection of outside
investors is very good, there is no need for monitoring in equilibrium, and the best arrangement
is a widely held professionally-managed firm.  When legal protection of outside investors is
moderate, the benefits of professional managers are still high enough for the entrepreneur to
surrender control, but it pays for him or his family to remain as large shareholders and monitor
the manager. Finally, with sufficiently weak shareholder protection, the founder’s ability to
control expropriation is too limited and he does not delegate management.  In this situation,
management stays with his family even when someone else can run the firm better.  In general,
this analysis leads to a prediction of a negative relationship between investor protection and
ownership concentration, consistent with a range of empirical evidence.
   We consider two versions of the model, one in which the large shareholder – when he
detects expropriation – forces the manager to stop it and pay dividends, and another in which he
and the manager just share the spoils.  In the first version, as in Shleifer and Vishny (1986), the
large shareholder provides a public good to the minority shareholders by monitoring or
jawboning.  In the second version, monitoring is no longer a public good, the benefits of which
are shared by all shareholders.  To the contrary, there is a perverse incentive for monitoring,
namely to share the loot. The basic results we describe hold in both specifications, but the second
version also yields the empirically accurate prediction of a positive premium paid for a6
controlling block of shares.
At a theoretical level, the model combines in one unified framework the twin conflicts
essential to understanding corporate governance: that between the manager and the outside
shareholders, and that between the large shareholder and the minority shareholders.  By doing so,
the model sheds light on the different patterns of ownership and management among countries.
It shows, for example, why Anglo-Saxon patterns of corporate governance, with widely-held
firms and traditional conflicts between professional managers and dispersed shareholders (Berle
and Means 1932), are likely to be a feature of countries with very good legal protection of
minority shareholders.   It explains why “family” firms, in which the founder’s family is a
significant shareholder, or even the manager, over several generations are such an enduring
phenomenon in countries with less effective legal protection of shareholders (La Porta et al.
1999, Claessens et al. 2000).   Indeed, it explains how, in such countries, the twin conflicts
between the manager and the large shareholder and between the two of them combined and the
minority shareholders, coexist.  The model is moreover consistent with the growing body of
evidence that family management is generally inferior to professional management (Morck et al.
2000, Perez-Gonzales 2001).  The basic trade-off between the benefits of delegated management,
and the costs of giving up control – especially when legal protection is poor – appears consistent
with a great deal of data.
  Our paper joins a growing theoretical literature on corporate governance in the regimes of
poor investor protection.  Bebchuk (1999) shows that poor legal protection renders dispersed
ownership structure unstable, because it allows extraction of significant private benefits.  La
Porta et al. (2002) and Himmelberg et al. (2001) study theoretically and empirically the
determination of ownership structure when firms raise funds to finance investment.  Burkart and7
Panunzi (2001) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) analyze the impact of legal shareholder
protection on the optimal ownership structure.  Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) consider owner-
managers and examine the relationship between legal protection and inside equity. Burkart and
Panunzi (2001) assume that the professional manager and the large shareholder are distinct
parties and analyze the relationship between the law and outside ownership concentration. By
making the separation of ownership and management a choice variable, the present model
extends and generalizes these two papers.
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 examines the
founder’s decision to hire a professional manager and to float shares when he cannot extract
private benefits. Section 4 analyses the case with collusion between founder and professional
manager and derives implications for share value, block premium, and agency costs of separating
ownership and management.  Section 5 concludes.  Mathematical proofs are in the appendix.
II. The  model
Figure 1 presents the model’s timeline. We consider a firm initially fully owned by its
founder. At date 0, the founder decides whether to appoint a professional manager to run the firm
or keep management in the family. Simultaneously, he decides what fraction 1-α  of the shares to
sell to dispersed shareholders. The family keeps the remaining fraction α .  All shareholders are
risk-neutral. If management stays in the family, there is no separation of ownership and
management. If the founder appoints a professional manager, ownership and management are
separated. In this case, the founder may also offer a wage and the professional manager accepts
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At date 3, the firm generates revenues that depend on the identity of the manager. If
control remains inside the family, total revenues generated are  F v . If a professional manager
runs the firm, total revenues are  M v . The professional has an outside option that gives him utility
c.   For simplicity, the outside option of the founder or the family is normalized to zero.
Assumption 1:  F M v c v > −
There are two interpretations of the model. Under the first, the choice is between the
founder himself, who is becoming outdated or reluctant to manage, and a professional outsider.
Under the second, the founder definitely retires from management, and chooses as his successor
either a professional manager or his heir. In both interpretations, retaining management inside
the family reduces the profitability of the firm relative to hiring a professional.
1
Assumption 1 is consistent with recent study by Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung (2000) of
corporate control of Canadian firms.  They find that heir-controlled firms have lower returns on
sales and assets than comparable firms. Furthermore, firms with founder control have earnings
                                                          
1 In this model, we abstract from the possibility that appointing a child as the CEO may be an additional private
benefit to the founder.  Introducing this feature would not change our results.9
that are lower than those of widely held firms but higher than those in heir-controlled firms.
Perez-Gonzales (2001) provides evidence on firm performance following inherited control by
studying 162 family transitions in the United States.  In 38% of these cases, family members
inherit the CEO position.  These family CEOs are promoted to the post an average of 9 years
earlier than professional managers and are detrimental to firm performance- the return on assets
falls by 16% within two years of transition and 25% compared with unrelated CEOs.
In this model, if the founder is the best manager himself, there is no reason for him ever
to sell equity.  He stays on as the manager, keeps 100% of the firm, and there are no agency
problems or conflicts.  This assumption distinguishes the model from the papers of La Porta et al.
(2002), Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), and Himmelberg et al. (2001), where equity is raised to
finance investment projects, and therefore the size of the firm is endogenous.
The problems arise when the founder is no longer the best manager.  He must then
choose between hiring a more qualified outsider to manage, or alternatively staying on or
(equivalently) naming a mediocre son as a successor.  Importantly, we assume that the competent
professional outsider has neither the resources nor the external funds to just buy the firm himself.
As we show below, the outsiders’ inability to raise external funds is consistent with the
assumptions of the model, since to buy the firm, he has to pay for the private benefits accruing to
the founder, which he cannot pledge to investors. Unless the superior manager is himself rich, he
has to work for the family.  Hiring a professional gives rise to a separation of ownership from
management.
At date 2, shareholders can monitor the professional manager and thereby deprive him of
at least some private benefits. The monitoring technology is discussed below.
At date 3, the revenues can either be paid out to all shareholders proportionally to their10
ownership stakes or diverted to generate private benefits. In countries with weakest shareholder
protection, such private benefits take the form of outright theft. More commonly, they take the
form of transactions with related parties, expropriation of corporate opportunities, transfer
pricing, excessive salaries and perquisites, and so on (see Johnson et al. 2000).
Whoever manages the firm chooses the level of expropriation, subject to being monitored
and partially impeded by the law. The non-contractible expropriation decision is modeled as the
choice of  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ φ  such that security benefits (dividends) are  i v ) 1 ( φ − and private benefits are
i v φ , . ,F M i =  Expropriation of shareholders is limited by the law. To model legal shareholder
protection, we assume that the law sets an upper bound  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ φ  on the fraction of revenues that
can be (at no cost) diverted by the party in control.
2  Stronger legal protection corresponds to
lower values of φ .
The law is not the only determinant of the fraction of resources diverted for private
benefits.  The other is monitoring, which occurs when a professional manager is hired. Although
in principle all shareholders can monitor the manager, the free-rider problem prevents small
shareholders from choosing to incur the cost.  In equilibrium only the large shareholder monitors
to reduce the fraction of resources appropriated by the manager.
3 Recall that the legal upper
bound on private benefits of control is  M v φ . Following Pagano and Röell (1998), we assume that




k  reduce private benefit extraction by  M mv  where
                                                          
2 The amount  i v φ is the legal upper bound that can be extracted as private benefits of control, irrespective of the
form in which those benefits are enjoyed. In particular, wages in excess of market value are already incorporated in
i v φ .
3 We assume that there is no reason for the founder to sell his shares to another large shareholder who would
monitor, since, if anything, the founder would have a comparative advantage at monitoring because of his
knowledge.11
[0,1] m∈  and  0 k > .
Private monitoring and the law are alternative mechanisms for reducing expropriation of
shareholders. When k  is strictly positive, monitoring is costly for the founder whereas reliance
on the law is free. The public benefits of the law may not be free from the viewpoint of society,
but they are to the founder. The interaction between these two mechanisms of policing the
manager shapes the equilibrium governance structure.
Importantly, we assume that corporate and other law governing investor protection
matters, and that firms cannot opt into more protective legal regimes by contract.  This
assumption is consistent with the evidence that legal rules governing investor protection in
different countries have significant consequences for financial development (La Porta et al. 1997,
1998, 2000).  In this model, if a founder could effectively opt into a more protective legal
regime, he would do so since in equilibrium he pays for all the private benefits of control out of
his own pocket.
If a professional manager is hired, the question arises whether a monitoring founder can
enjoy (part of) the private benefits. We consider both the cases of collusion and no collusion
between the professional manager and the founder. Excluding the founder from the spoils of
extraction is tantamount to assuming that his interests and those of the small shareholders are
perfectly congruent. This case is most appropriate when the legal duties of the large shareholder,
perhaps as a board member, bar him from complicity with the manager in expropriating
shareholders. In contrast, when the founder and the professional manager can share the private
benefits, they may collude at the expense of minority shareholders. This assumption might be
more suitable for weaker legal regimes. The second assumption complicates the model, in that
rent-seeking monitoring, intended to capture some of the private benefits rather than serve all12
shareholders, becomes attractive. We solve the model under the first assumption in the next
section, and under the second in section IV.
III.  Owner-Manager or Professional Manager
We analyze the founder’s decision whether to hire a professional manager in steps. We
begin by considering the founder’s maximization problem for the cases of non-separation and
separation of ownership and management. In each case, we solve the model by backward
induction, going from the date 3 expropriation decision, to the founder’s date 2 monitoring
intensity, to the manager’s date 1 job acceptance choice. We then can determine the optimal
number of shares that the founder retains in cases of separation and non-separation. Having done
that, we can compare the entrepreneur’s welfare for different legal environments, i.e., different
values of φ , which enables us to infer under what circumstances he chooses to separate
ownership from management.
A) No Separation of Ownership and Management
Due to the simplicity of the model, the case of no separation does not yield precise
predictions, notably for the ownership structure. At date 3 the founder decides how to allocate
the revenues subject to the limits set by the law. By law, he cannot divert more than  v φ  of the
revenues as private benefits. Unless he owns all the shares, in which case he is indifferent
between any  [0, ] φφ ∈ , he extracts the legal upper bound φ .  Absent a professional manager,
there is neither date 2 monitoring nor a date 1 job acceptance decision. Hence, we move directly13
to the founder’s date 0 decision as to which fraction of shares to sell to outside investors. He
maximizes the sum of his date 3 block value (1 ) FF vv α φφ −+  and of the proceeds from selling
1 α − shares at date 0.  We refer to this payoff as the founder’s welfare 
NS V .  Since private
benefit extraction is efficient and since the founder is by assumption neither financially
constrained nor risk averse, the optimal ownership structure is indeterminate when ownership
and management are separated.
Lemma 1: For any  [0,1] φ ∈ , 
* ()
NS
F Vv α =  and  [ ]
* 0,1 α ∈ .
The founder’s welfare is equal to the total revenues under his management. Even though
private benefit extraction decreases with the quality of the law, the founder’s welfare is
independent of the legal environment. Since the extraction of private benefits is efficient, each
diverted dollar reduces the security benefits by a dollar. The sum of security and private benefits
and hence the founder’s welfare is constant.
B) Separation of ownership and management
What happens when ownership and management are separated? On the one hand, the
professional manager prefers to divert corporate revenues as private benefits to himself rather
than pay them out as dividends to the shareholders. While the law constrains diversion, the
founder can further limit private benefit extraction through monitoring. On the other hand, this
possibility may induce opportunistic behavior by the founder even when he does not share in the
private benefits. Once the professional manager has accepted to run the firm and revenues are14
realized, the founder has an incentive to reduce the professional manager’s private benefits by
monitoring more. Anticipating high levels of monitoring, the professional manager may reject
the offer to run the firm. That is, the founder may over-monitor in the sense of the ex post
optimal monitoring level exceeding the ex ante optimal amount (Pagano and Roell 1998). To
induce the manager to accept running the firm, the founder has to commit himself not to monitor
excessively. He can do so by dispersing (some of) the shares to small investors because the
actual monitoring intensity is determined by the size of the founder’s equity stake (Burkart,
Gromb, and Panunzi 1997). In addition (or instead), the founder may offer the professional
manager monetary incentives to convince him to run the firm.
We solve the game by backward induction, beginning with the date 3 resource allocation
decision. Total revenues under the professional manager are  M v . The law stipulates that
M v ) 1 ( φ −  must be paid out either to shareholders as dividends or to the professional manager as
salary. What fraction of the remaining  M v φ  is actually diverted depends on monitoring. The
founder monitoring with intensity m can control the use of an additional fraction m  (or at most
φ ) of  M v . Being excluded from sharing private benefits, the founder forces the professional
manager to disgorge all of them as dividends. The professional manager then has discretion over
{ } M v m) ( , 0 max − φ  in resources. He strictly prefers to extract them as private benefits, unless he
is the sole shareholder.
Since private benefit extraction is efficient, there are no gains to shareholders from using
monetary incentives to resolve the conflict over resource allocation. To induce the manager to
abstain from extracting an additional dollar, shareholders have to offer him this dollar as a
transfer. Monetary incentives, henceforth called the wage, can, however, play a role in inducing15
the manager to accept the job of running the firm. Let  M wv  denote the wage paid to the
professional manager when he accepts the job offer from the founder.
4
At date 2, the founder chooses the monitoring intensity. For a given block α  and for a




k v m w M − + − − φ α .
5 He receives a fraction α
of the security benefits net of the wage bill less his monitoring costs. Since the law already
shields  M v ) 1 ( φ −  of the revenues from private benefit extraction, the founder never monitors










M α φ , min and weakly increases with the block size.
At date 1, the manager accepts to run the firm if the sum of the wage and the private
benefits exceeds his outside utility c.




w m m − + = ≤ φ
 High levels of monitoring and strict legal rules reduce the professional manager’s private
benefits and may thus discourage him from running the firm.  Offering him a higher wage can
sway him to accept the job.  Higher ownership concentration and better legal protection make it
more difficult to satisfy the professional manager’s participation constraint, whereas higher
wages make it easier.  This is the basic trade-off when ownership and management are separated.





k v m w V M
s − + − − = φ  subject to the manager’s participation constraint.
                                                          
4 The subsequent analysis implicitly assumes that  1 w φ +< , which holds in equilibrium.
5 The range  [0,1] m∈  implies that  M kv ≥ .
6 An alternative interpretation of the model is one where the manager has to exert an effort to generate revenues
M v and cis the disutility of the effort.16
If the founder were to choose an ownership structure such that 
M v
k
φα < , the professional
manager would be left with zero private benefits. Consequently, the founder would have to offer
a wage wc =  to induce the professional manager to accept the job. Leaving some private
benefits to the professional manager in exchange for a lower wage saves on monitoring costs.
Hence, the founder always chooses an ownership structure such that 
M v
k























φ − + − − = with 
2 /( 1 ) / 0
S
M dV d v k αα =− ≥  and  / 0
S
M dV dw v =− < .
The founder’s welfare increases with ownership concentration and decreases with the wage,
provided that the professional manager’s participation constraint is satisfied.
A binding participation constraint is obviously in the interest of the founder as any
managerial rent comes at his expense. Sometimes, however, the founder cannot avoid leaving
some rents to the professional manager. More precisely, there are parameter values for which the
participation constraint  c v m w M ≥ − + ) ( φ does not bind despite a fully concentrated ownership
structure and a zero wage.  This occurs when  // MM vk c v φ >+ .  We want to allow for the
possibility of legal regimes in which the professional manager can extract a rent.







Since  1 ≤ φ , Assumption 2 is a necessary condition for   // MM vk c v φ >+  to hold.17
Lemma 2
i)  For  ,
M v
c
≤ φ  , 0
* = α   φ − = M v c w /
* ,  0
* = m , and
c v w V M
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When legal protection is strong (case i), then, even in the absence of monitoring, private
benefits are insufficient to induce the professional manager to run the firm. Consequently,
ownership is completely dispersed and the professional manager is offered a wage equal to the
difference between his outside utility and the private benefits. The founder’s resulting welfare
** (,, )
S Vw α φ is at its first best level ( c vM − ) and does not depend on the quality of legal rules.
When legal protection is moderate (case ii), expected private benefits exceed the outside
utility c. As a result, the founder has to monitor the professional manager to limit the size of his
rent. Setting the wage equal to zero minimizes the monitoring intensity that keeps the
professional manager’s participation constraint binding. Since monitoring is costly, this
dominates all other combinations of positive wage and monitoring level that also leave no rent to
the professional manager. A positive wage and concentrated ownership do not co-exist in18
equilibrium. Due to the monitoring costs, the founder’s welfare 
** (,, )
S Vw α φ  is below its first
best level. Moreover, 
** (,, )
S Vw α φ  decreases in both φ  and k : less legal protection entails a
higher optimal level of monitoring, and a higher k makes monitoring more expensive.
When legal protection is poor (case iii) the founder cannot avoid leaving a rent to the
professional manager. Offering a zero wage and retaining all shares to implement a monitoring
level  / M mv k =  is all that the founder can do. The resulting rent to the professional manager is




M − − = ) (φ . The founder’s welfare 
** (,, )
S Vw α φ  is equal to the first best
( c vM − ) less monitoring costs and managerial rent. As in the range with moderate legal
protection, 
** (,, )
S Vw α φ  decreases in both φ  and k .
We now turn to the final step of determining the conditions under which the founder
chooses to hire a professional manager. The answer follows from comparing the founder’s
welfare under no separation 
NS V  (Lemma 1) to that under separation 
S V  (Lemma 2). The next
two Propositions describe the overall equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 1
When legal shareholder protection is strong ( / M cv φ ≤ ), ownership and management are
separated, and ownership is fully dispersed.
When legal rules are very protective, the separation of ownership and management only
brings benefits by allowing the founder to capitalize on the superior ability of the professional
manager. The strong legal protection also solves at no cost to the founder the agency conflict
over the allocation of revenues. More precisely, the law restricts private benefit extraction below19
the professional manager’s outside utility. Letting this manager divert corporate resources is part
of his compensation package, which needs to be supplemented by a wage. In this case, selling all
the equity and hiring a professional manager is the optimal choice for the founder.
In this model, a legal system with strong protection of outside shareholders, i.e., with
M v
c
≤ φ , achieves the first best level of social efficiency.  The best manager is hired to run the
firm, and no resources are wasted on monitoring.  This conclusion is driven by the fact that, in
this model, law enforcement is free – at least from the viewpoint of the founder.  If better legal
protection imposes higher enforcement on the society, we would have to compare the social
costs of private monitoring with the social costs of law enforcement.
7
Once investor protection falls below the threshold of Proposition 1, so  / M cv φ > , the
professional manager can expect to appropriate corporate resources in excess of his outside
utility. As a consequence, monitoring is needed to limit the size of his rent.  In this case, the
separation of ownership and management involves a trade-off: on the one hand, the firm is run
by a more qualified manager; on the other hand, the founder has to incur monitoring costs (and
possibly leave a rent to the professional manager). Denote by 
*
(/ , 1 ) M cv φ ∈  the unique value of
φ  such that 
** (,, )
SN S VwV αφ = .  This value exists if 
2 /2 MF vk v < .
Proposition 2
i) If 
2 /2 MF vk v <  holds, ownership and management are separated and the founder
retains a block when legal protection is moderate 
*
(/ , ] M cv φφ ∈ . When legal protection is poor
                                                          
7 The private and social calculations would be further complicated when there are private costs of compliance with
legal rules.  For example, the costs of complying with better accounting and disclosure standards might be higher.20
*
φφ > , there is no separation of ownership and management.
ii) If 
2 /2 MF vk v ≥ , ownership and management are always separated, and the founder
retains a block when legal protection is moderate or poor.
When ownership and management are separated, the founder’s welfare 
S V decreases with
φ , because weaker legal protection entails higher monitoring costs and (possibly) an increasing
managerial rent. Accordingly, 
S V  reaches its minimum when the law does not provide any
protection (φ =1). In this case, all dividend payments are exclusively due to monitoring, fully
concentrated ownership is optimal, and 
2 /2
S
M Vvk = . In contrast, when ownership and
management are not separated, the founder’s welfare is  F v  and independent of the quality of
legal protection. Hence, there exists a unique threshold value 
*
φ below which monitoring costs
and managerial rent  are less than the gain in managerial efficiency () MF vc v −− . Conversely,
for 
*
φφ >  the forgone efficiency loss associated with keeping control in the family is smaller
than the agency costs of separating ownership and management. If, however, the discrepancy
between the managerial abilities of the professional and that of the founder (or his heir) is very
large, keeping management in the family is inferior irrespective of the quality of the law. This
holds when the revenues under family control are smaller than the dividends rescued from
managerial expropriation by monitoring only, i.e., when 
2 /2 MF vk v ≥ . In this case the founder or
family simply retains an ownership stake whose size depends on legal protection.
The model has a clear implication for how the law shapes ownership structure:21
Proposition 3
For ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ α , more concentrated ownership structures go together with weaker legal
protection, i.e.,  /0 dd αφ≥ .
The founder’s objective under separation of ownership and management is to pay the
professional manager no more than his outside utility. Both legal protection and monitoring
restrict the professional manager’s ability to extract private benefits. Since the law limits
extraction at no cost, the founder resorts to monitoring only to the extent that the law leaves the
manager a payoff in excess of his outside utility. To restore a binding participation constraint on
the professional manager, the founder has to monitor more as legal protection deteriorates. Thus,
for  (/ ,/ /] MM M cv cv v k φ ∈+  legal protection and ownership concentration are inversely related
under separation of ownership and management.
8
Propositions 2 and 3 make strong empirical predictions, namely that family ownership
should be common around the world, and relatively more common in countries with poor
investor protection.  Recent empirical work is consistent with these predictions. Family control is
the dominant form of corporate ownership around the world.  Looking at the 20 largest firms in
27 wealthy economies, La Porta et al. (1999) find that families or individuals control 30% in
number and 25% in value of the top 20 firms in each country.  These numbers are much higher
for smaller firms.  Family transitions are a frequent and important occurrence: only about one
third of family controlled firms are run by their founders, the rest by descendants or by families
                                                          
8 The (inverse) relationship between ownership concentration and legal protection depends crucially on the absence
of wealth constraints of the founder and the assumed monitoring technology. In particular, the positive relationship
between optimal monitoring intensity and ownership concentration relies on the assumption that the incentive to
monitor depends on the ownership stake but is independent of legal protection. By contrast, when legal protection
has a direct impact on the (marginal) return from monitoring the relationship between the quality of the law and
ownership concentration is not monotone (Burkart and Panunzi 2001).22
that came to own them later.  In addition, LLSV (1999) show that widely held firms are more
common in countries with good shareholder protection- 34% versus 16% in the countries with a
low level of protection. Moreover, ownership patterns tend to be relatively stable.  In short, when
expropriation is a concern, firms remain family controlled.
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) find that with the exception of Japan, more than
50% of all publicly traded firms in nine East Asian countries are controlled by families and that
the top 15 families control significant shares of country wealth.
9  East Asian countries outside
Japan are indeed known for particularly poor protection of outside investors.  Faccio and Lang
(2002) find higher incidence of family firms in countries with inferior shareholder protection in a
large sample of West European corporations.  The European Corporate Governance Network
(2001) documents the prevalence of concentrated corporate ownership in OECD countries.
Propositions 1 and 2 analyze the legal circumstances under which professional managers
of a given quality are hired. Alternatively, one can consider the managerial efficiency gain
necessary to have separation of ownership and management in a regime with weak legal
protection.
Corollary 1
The separation of ownership and management requires higher managerial skills in
regimes with poorer legal shareholder protection.
The founder’s welfare under separation 
S V  increases with both the professional
                                                          
9 In Taiwan, the top 15 families control 20.1% of listed corporate assets; in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, the top 15 families control more than 25% of listed corporate assets.23
manager’s ability (higher  c vM −   values) and the quality of the law (lower φ  values).  In
contrast, the founder’s welfare under no separation 
NS V is independent of φ .  Ceteris paribus, the
switch from keeping family control to hiring a professional manager requires a more able
professional manager when legal protection is less effective: Such legal regimes are associated
with higher agency costs of separation of management and control. To make hiring a
professional manager nonetheless worthwhile, the efficiency gain must be larger.  
The section has analyzed how legal rules affect the trade-off between the benefits and
costs of separating ownership and management. The model predicts three different patterns of
ownership and management: separation with dispersed ownership, separation with block
ownership, and no separation. Some implications of our basic model do, however, clash with the
empirical evidence. In particular, the model implies that the founder’s block trades at a discount
when ownership and management are separated. This prediction is inconsistent with the
empirical evidence on block premia, which are both positive and higher in countries with weaker
protection of outside shareholders (Zingales 1994, Nenova 2001, Dyck and Zingales 2002).  The
reason for this result in our model is that all shareholders benefit in proportion of their
shareholding from monitoring, but only the founder bears the cost.  The negative block premium
follows from the assumption that the founder cannot extract any private benefits, thereby
ensuring that monitoring is a public good. We relax this assumption in the next section and allow
the founder to benefit privately from his monitoring activity.
A final theoretical point needs to be made before we move on.  In the model, we have
assumed that ownership structure remains stable once the manager has accepted to run the
company. If the founder had the opportunity and incentive to retrade ex-post, he may want to
increase his stake and extract a higher fraction of private benefits from the manager. This, in24
turn, would affect the decision of the manager to accept the offer to run the company.  For the
model in this section, we can prove that, so long as trade in not anonymous, the purchase of an
additional fraction of shares is not profitable for the founder.  Because shareholders free ride on
the entire value improvement implied by the founder’s final holding,
10 the founder does not
make a profit on the additional shares acquired in the retrading stage. Moreover, the increase in
the monitoring costs due to the larger final holding exceeds the increase in the value of the shares
owned initially by the founder. Things are more complicated when trade is anonymous
(DeMarzo and Urosevic 2001), or when the founder shares some of the private benefits of
control with the manager, as in the next section.  In these instances, we need to make the
assumption that there is no retrading, or alternatively that the manager’s wage can be conditioned
on the founder’s final equity stake.
IV. Transferable private benefits of control
In the previous section, the founder could not by assumption extract any private benefits
unless he managed the firm himself.  The founder’s interest and those of the minority
shareholders are perfectly congruent when a professional manager runs the firm. In this section
we consider the other extreme, where the private benefits are perfectly transferable, thereby
aligning the founder’s interest in expropriation with that of the professional manager. The
possibility of sharing the spoils with the professional manager provides an additional rationale
for monitoring. Besides protecting the founder against the threat of managerial expropriation,
monitoring also secures him a (larger) share of the private benefits, thereby making it a rent-
                                                          
10 A proof of a similar result is contained in Burkart, Gromb, Panunzi (1997) and Pagano and Roell (1998).25
seeking activity.
Below we repeat the analytical steps of the previous section and establish that the
existence of the three patterns of separation of ownership and management extends to the case of
transferable private benefits. We then explore the implications of the model for the relationship
between legal protection, share value, block premium, and the agency costs of separating
ownership and management. Transferable private benefits only matter in the presence of a
professional manager, leaving the founder’s welfare in the case of no separation unchanged
(Lemma 1).  We therefore move directly to the case of separation of ownership and management.
At date 3, the law imposes that  M v ) 1 ( φ − be paid out either as dividends to all
shareholders or as the wage to the professional manager. The founder and the professional
manager bargain over how to allocate the remaining  M v φ . The outside options in the bargaining
depend on  monitoring. If the founder monitors with intensity m, his outside option is
{ } M M v mv φ α α , min  and that of the professional manager is  { } M v m) ( , 0 max − φ . The surplus to be
shared between the two parties amounts to  { } M M v mv φ α α ) 1 ( , ) 1 ( min − − , the revenues that would
accrue to the minority shareholders if no agreement is reached. Under the assumption of equal











































these payoffs exceed their outside options, the founder and the manager always agree to set
φφ = .
11
                                                          
11 The question arises again whether there are any gains from using monetary incentives to induce the manager to
abstain from extracting private benefits.  At first glance this seems possible, since the manager receives only half of
the surplus.  While the use of such a compensation scheme is in the minority shareholders’ interest, the founder
prefers ex post to extract private benefits.  Since such extraction is efficient, the founder is ex ante indifferent.  All
that matters is to keep the manager’s participation constraint binding, i.e., to leave him no rents.26
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φ . If  (1 ) / 2 M vk φα >+  holds, monitoring does not depend on the block size
and is purely driven by the prospect of extracting a part of the private benefits. Otherwise
( (1 ) / 2 M vk φα ≤+ ), monitoring is a function of both private benefits and the ownership stake.
Indeed, decomposing the first order condition into  (/ ) [ ( 1) / 2 ] (/ ) MM vk vk αα +−  reveals
the two motives for monitoring. The first term reflects monitoring in the absence of collusion
aimed at preventing managerial expropriation of the founder’s stake α . The second term
captures the additional monitoring that the founder undertakes to appropriate some of the private
benefits. While monitoring increases as before with the block size α , the second term implies
that monitoring is positive even when the founder retains no shares, i.e.,  . 0 ) 0 ( > m  This implies
that the founder cannot withdraw from the firm. To remove this purely mechanical feature of the
model, we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 3: If the founder retains less than  0 > α , he abstains from monitoring.
Assumption 3 simply means that, to monitor effectively, the founder must have some
power over the manager, and for that he needs a minimum ownership stake.  This stake may
enable him to sit on the board, to have enough shares to convene an extraordinary shareholder
meeting, to have standing in litigation, or to exercise power in other ways.  When the stake of the27
founder is below the threshold α , he has no power vis-à-vis the manager. Put differently, owning
a stake below α  and dispersing the shares among small investors enables the founder to commit
not to interfere through monitoring in the running of the firm.
12
When  αα ≥ , the founder monitors in part to avoid expropriation by the professional
manager, but he does so only to help himself.  Indeed, from the minority shareholders’
perspective, monitoring is a pure rent-seeking activity. The founder and the professional manager
agree to set φφ =  irrespective of the monitoring intensity m.
13  This result illustrates an
important difference between legal shareholder protection and monitoring: while the law protects
all the shareholders, monitoring in this model is a form of self-protection by the founder that has
either positive or negative externalities for other investors.
At date 1, the professional manager accepts to run the firm if the wage and his share of





























The maximum level of monitoring compatible with the professional manager’s
participation constraint decreases with the founder’s stake. A larger block increases the founder’s
outside option in the bargaining, thereby reducing the share of private benefits that the
                                                          
12 In the absence of collusion, fully dispersed ownership (α =0) ensures no monitoring (m(0)=0).  Introducing a
threshold α  in Section III would have complicated the analysis without adding any insight.
13 If one introduces a dead-weight loss associated with private benefit extraction, monitoring also benefits minority
shareholders because the founder internalizes part of the inefficiency and hence reduces the level of diversion
(Burkart and Panunzi (2001)).28
professional manager obtains. Nonetheless, as (1 )/2 1, α +≤ the threshold m  is higher for a
given wage w and legal protection φ  when founder and professional manager collude than in the
absence of collusion. Withholding  M mv ) 1 ( α −  from the minority shareholders makes it more
likely that the professional manager’s participation constraint is satisfied.
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As monitoring weakly increases with the block size, the founder’s welfare increases in α
and decreases in w. As in the absence of collusion, the optimal ownership structure is as
concentrated as possible and the optimal wage as low as possible provided that the manager’s
participation constraint is satisfied.  To simplify the analysis, we impose an upper bound on α .







The threshold  0 α >  
14  (Assumption 3) and Assumption 4 imply that the equilibrium
monitoring intensity 
* m  is given by the first order condition 
* (1 ) / 2 M mv k α =+ . In the absence
of the threshold  0 α >  or of its upper bound, monitoring intensity for small φ  values would be
determined by the legal threshold ( φ =
* m ), leaving the ownership structure indeterminate in that
range of φ  values.  Nonetheless, all our subsequent results on founder welfare, share value, and
                                                          
14 As  0 > α , Assumption 4 implies that  /2 / MM vk c v ≤ .29
separation of ownership and management are robust with respect to relaxing Assumptions 3 and
4.
Lemma 3
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Lemma 3 replicates Lemma 2 with an added twist due to collusion and the discontinuity30
in the feasible monitoring level.
15  In particular, region i) coincides with region i) in Lemma 2
and region v) with region iii) of Lemma 2.
The differences between transferable and non-transferable private benefits appear in the
intermediate range of legal protection.  In region iv), weak legal protection permits private
benefits to an extent that sharing them between the founder and the manager is compatible with
the participation constraint and a zero wage.  Indeed, to avoid leaving a rent to the manager, the
founder has to retain αα >  and monitor accordingly.  In contrast, in regions ii) and iii), where
the law is more protective, a zero wage, sharing of private benefits, and satisfying the manager’s
participation constraint are not compatible with each other. Because of the discontinuity in
monitoring, the founder faces a trade-off between under- and over-monitoring. More precisely,
the founder has the option to either not monitor or to monitor at least  (1 ) / 2 M mv k α =+ . While
abstaining from monitoring concedes a rent to the professional manager, monitoring with
intensity  (1 ) / 2 M mv k α =+  requires a positive wage to satisfy the participation constraint. In
region ii), the sum of the wage and the monitoring cost when  (1 ) / 2 M mv k α =+  exceeds the rent
that the professional manager can extract.  Hence, it is optimal to fully disperse ownership and to
leave the manager with a rent of c v R M − = φ . The reverse holds in region iii): over-monitoring
and compensating the professional manager with a wage to satisfy the participation constraint is
less costly to the founder. Consequently, the optimal ownership concentration jumps to  α α =
* .
Another implication of Lemma 3 is that the founder cannot gain from selling the entire
company to a penniless professional manager who would raise funds in the capital market. From
                                                          
15 Irrespective of Assumptions 3 and 4, the equilibrium outcome with collusion is more complicated than Lemma 2.
In the absence of Assumptions 3 and 4, the complication is due to the fact that monitoring may be determined by the
law ( φ =
* m  ) rather than by the first order condition.31
the discussion of the no separation case, it follows that the professional manager could raise at
most  M v ) 1 ( φ − in the market. Moreover, he will never pay more than  c vM − . Simple inspection
shows that the founder’s welfare 
S V  is always at least as large as the minimum of  M v ) 1 ( φ − and
c vM − . Hence selling the entire company to a penniless manager is weakly dominated by selling
(some) stock in the market and hiring a professional manager.
The feature of Lemma 3 that is both crucial for the subsequent results and robust to
relaxing Assumptions 3 and 4 is that the agency cost of separation of ownership and
management rises as investor protections become weaker. When φ  increases, the professional
manager can appropriate a larger fraction of the revenues.  This in turn implies either more
monitoring or a larger rent. Since the founder ultimately bears the agency cost, his welfare
weakly decreases with φ .
The final step in analyzing the founder’s decision to hire a professional manager (and to
float part of the equity) is the comparison of Lemma 1 with Lemma 3. Since Lemma 2 and 3
coincide for  / M cv φ ≤ , Proposition 1 continues to hold. When legal protection is good
( / M cv φ ≤ ), ownership and management are separated and ownership is fully dispersed. When
legal protection is less strong ( / M cv φ > ),  the founder’s welfare 
S V  under separation and
collusion (weakly) decreases with φ . Consequently, Proposition 2 also continues to hold. If the
discrepancy between the competence of the professional manager and that of the founder is very
large (
2 /2 MF vk v ≥ ), separation is superior for any  (/ , 1 ] M cv φ ∈ . Otherwise (
2 /2 MF vk v < ), there
exists a unique threshold 
**
(/ , 1 ] M cv φ ∈  above which the agency cost exceeds the loss in
managerial efficiency, and keeping management in the family is optimal. The threshold 
* *
φ32
again denotes the φ  value where 
** (,, )
SN S VwV αφ =  holds.  As we show below, it is smaller
than the threshold 
*
φ  derived in the previous section.  The only qualitative difference from the
case with non-transferable private benefits is that separation and concentrated ownership may or
may not be an equilibrium outcome. That is, the threshold value 
**
φ  at which the founder
switches to no separation may entail a concentrated or a dispersed ownership structure under
separation, i.e., both 
** *() α φ α > and 
** *() 0 αφ =  are possible.
From the founder’s perspective, legal protection and monitoring are substitutes: both
restrict the professional manager’s ability to extract private benefits. While monitoring is costly,
better legal protection comes at no cost to the founder. This has two implications. First, as legal
protection improves, the level of monitoring falls, which in turn entails a less concentrated
ownership structure.  Proposition 3 thus also holds with transferable private benefits: legal
protection and ownership concentration are inversely related under separation of ownership and
management. Second, weaker legal protection raises the agency cost of separation. Hence, hiring
a professional manager in regimes with weaker legal rules requires higher managerial skills
(Corollary 1).
The quality of the law also affects share value, defined as the total amount of dividends
paid out to all shareholders at the final date.
Proposition 4
Share value increases as legal shareholder protection improves.
From the minority shareholders’ perspective, monitoring is not a substitute for legal
protection when private benefits are transferable.  Ex post, both the founder and the manager33
prefer to extract private benefits.  As a rent-seeking activity, monitoring merely determines how
the two split these private benefits.  In contrast, the law prescribes that no less than  M v ) 1 ( φ −  is
used for dividends and wage payments. Hence, the expected share value is equal to
M v w S ) 1 ( − − = φ . For 
M v
c
> φ , better legal protection unambiguously increases share value
because the reduction in private benefits exceeds the wage increase. Nonetheless, the minority
shareholders are indifferent with respect to the quality of the legal rules because they always get
what they pay for. Because the minority shareholders anticipate at date 0 that the founder and the
manager will divert the fraction φ  of revenues, the founder’s proceeds from selling (1 ) α − shares
are equal to (1 )S α − .
Proposition 4 also holds when the founder or his family keeps control over the firm.
Since the founder sets φφ =  at date 3 (unless  1 α = ), better laws boost share value because a
larger fraction of the proceeds has to be paid out as dividends.
La Porta et al. (2002) examine the valuation of companies (relative to their assets) in
different countries, with different levels of shareholder protection.  They find that companies in
countries with above the world median measures of shareholder protection have Tobin’s q’s
about 20% higher than do comparable companies in countries with below world median
shareholder protection.  The positive association between investor protection and the valuation of
corporate assets survives a variety of controls for industry, ownership structure, and growth
opportunities.  Claessens et al. (2002) find similar evidence of higher valuation of companies in
more protective legal regimes using data from East Asia.
The positive relationship between share value and legal protection also has implications
for the value of the controlling block.34
Corollary 2
Total block premium 
S VS −  increases as legal shareholder protection falls.
When 
* (, 1 ) αα ∈ , the founder responds to lower investor protection by monitoring more.
Hence, his welfare is reduced by these extra monitoring costs (and possibly by the rent paid to
the manager). In contrast, monitoring has no positive impact on share value, and the law is the
only safeguard of dividends.  As a result, changes in the quality of the law have a larger impact
on share value than on the founder’s welfare.  Corollary 2 also holds when management and
ownership are not separated. Since the founder does not monitor in this case, his welfare is
independent of the law, while share value decreases with the quality of the law.
A number of recent empirical studies examine the valuation of block premia in different
jurisdictions.  For example, Zingales (1994) presents evidence of very significant premium on
the high voting rights shares trading on the Milan stock exchange.  Nenova (2001) explicitly
compares the value of a corporate voting right across legal jurisdictions in a sample of 661 dual-
class firms from 18 countries.  She presents striking evidence that control is more highly valued
in countries with inferior protection of minority shareholders, consistent with Corollary 2.
In contrast to minority shareholders whose wealth is independent of the law, the
founder’s welfare 
S V  increases with the quality of the law when ownership and management are
separated. The possibility of colluding with the manager also affects the founder’s welfare.
Proposition 5
Collusion between the founder and the manager increases the agency costs of separating
ownership and management.35
In equilibrium, the agency cost of separating ownership from management is the sum of
the monitoring cost and the managerial rent. Compared to the case with non-transferable private
benefits, the equilibrium level of monitoring is higher when private benefits are transferable.
This is so for two reasons. First, the rent-seeking motive induces the founder to monitor more for
a given α  and φ .  Higher levels of monitoring allow the founder to appropriate a larger share of
the private benefits.  From an ex ante perspective, however, the founder bears the cost of such
wasteful monitoring himself. Second, the professional manager receives a larger payoff for a
given monitoring intensity m. Rather than increasing the dividends for all shareholders by  M mv ,
the founder and the professional manager withhold the minority shareholders’ share  M mv ) 1 ( α −
and split it among themselves. Consequently, collusion requires higher monitoring levels in order
to avoid leaving a rent to the professional manager. When private benefits are transferable, the
impossibility of fine-tuning monitoring (under-monitoring) also allows the manager to obtain a
positive rent in the range  
2 [/ ,/ ( 1 ) / 8] MM M cv cv v k φα ∈+ + . The rent in very poor legal regimes
( // MM cv v k φ >+ ) is identical with non-transferable and transferable private benefits, as the two
cases coincide once ownership is fully concentrated ( 1 α = ).
The present model formalizes legal shareholder protection as a limit on the share of
corporate resources that the party in control can divert as private benefits.  The law can protect
shareholders in other ways as well.  One possibility suggested by Proposition 5 is that legal rules
can hinder or prevent collusion between the founder and the manager.  Examples of such legal
rules are equal treatment provisions and fiduciary duties. In fact, Proposition 5 provides a
rationale for such rules. They reduce the agency costs of separation of ownership from36
management, thereby increasing the founder’s welfare.
16
Collusion influences the founder’s welfare when ownership and management are
separated as well as his decision whether to hire a professional manager.
Corollary 3
Collusion between the founder and the manager is detrimental to the hiring of a
professional manager, i.e. 
* * *
φ φ ≤ .
When ownership and control are separated, the founder’s welfare is lower with
transferable than with non-transferable private benefits. In contrast, collusion has no impact on
his welfare when control is kept in the family. Hiring a professional manager is therefore
comparatively less attractive when private benefits are transferable.
VI. Conclusion: the separation of ownership from management
It is often claimed that there are two paradigms of corporate governance: the Anglo-
Saxon paradigm centered on the conflict between the shareholders and the manager, and the rest
of the world paradigm where the conflict is between large and small shareholders. We show that
the two paradigms are special cases of a single model of managerial succession, in which the
founder must simultaneously decide whether to hire an outside professional manager (as opposed
to keeping management in the family) and how much of the shares to float.   We argue that this
                                                          
16 By contrast, minority shareholder wealth is neither affected by the quality of the law nor by collusion, except for
unanticipated changes thereof. Then purchasing shares at date 0, they pay no more than the date 3 share value.37
decision is to some extent shaped by the degree of legal protection of minority shareholders, and
derive implications for optimal succession and ownership structures from this premise.
We show that in the regimes of the strongest legal protection of minority shareholders,
the optimal solution for the founder is to hire the best professional manager and sell off the entire
firm in the stock market.  This gives rise to the Anglo-Saxon model, in which the law is the
principal constraint on managerial discretion and the agency conflict is between the manager and
small minority shareholders.  With intermediate protection of minority shareholders, the founder
still hires a professional manager, but the law is not strong enough to control managerial
discretion, and the founder or his children must stay on as large shareholders to monitor the
manager.  This gives rise to the twin problems of a conflict between the manager and the
controlling shareholders, but also between the two of them and minority outside investors. When
the protection of minority shareholders is the weakest, the agency problems are too severe to
allow for separation of ownership and management.  The founding family must stay on and run
the firm; they can only afford to cede control to a professional manager if they make him a
member of the family.  The separation of ownership and management is thus an indication of a
superior corporate governance environment.  The lack of such separation, and the prevalence of
family firms, are evidence of financial underdevelopment.38
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(part ii).42
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Proof of Corollary 1
As 
NS V  is independent of φ , it suffices to show that for 
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Proof of Proposition 4
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Proof of Corollary 2
The block premium is meaningful only in the range where 
* 10 α >> , i.e. in regions iii)
and iv) of Lemma 3. For 
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Proof of Proposition 5
Denote by  NC S V  the founder’s welfare in the absence of collusion (Lemma 2) and by
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